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FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE January 5, 1968

SUBJECT: US ABM Deployment: Reactions in Japan

REF : Tokyo Telegrams 1869, 1890, 1907, 1968 of 20-22 September, 1967

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General Public Reaction: Not Much

The cited telegrams summarized reactions in Japan over the first few days after Secretary McNamara's September 18 address announcing the U. S. decision to deploy a light ABM system. Enclosure 1, an article from Kokubun (National Defense) is a brief analysis, written a few weeks later of the initial Japanese press reaction to the U. S. decision. Now that some three months have passed, an Embassy wrap-up summary might be useful to the Department and other addressees, together with a representative sampling of ABM-related articles which have appeared in Japanese newspapers or magazines.

Enclosures: (all unclassified)

1. Deployment of ABM's and The Tone of The Japanese Press
2. ABM Deployment Poses Problem for US Allies
3. ABM's and Japan
4. America's Plan for ABM Network and Japan
5. Soviet Union's "Orbital Bomb" Will Accelerate Military Expansion
6. Nuclear Weapons and Japan; In Connection with ABM Setup (4 Parts)
7. ABM Deployment Is Minus to International Situation - Probing the Possibility of Non-Nuclear ABM

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
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☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

P/M:SGeorge:ma

1/5/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

P/M:SGeorge

Clearances:

POL:HLevin

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As a broad generalization, comparatively little public attention has been paid to the U. S. ABM decision since the first major flurry of stories and articles, which for the most part deplored the U. S. step because of the alleged "spur to the arms race" angle. There are several good reasons for the fact that the ABM story as such did not have much of a public run here: the inherent and baffling complexity of the ABM issue, the general feeling that it is a U. S. rather than Japanese problem, the short attention span of the Japanese like any public, and probably most importantly, the fact that in the defense-related field generally, Okinawa and the nuclear storage issue as it concerns Okinawa have been so dominant in the press and public mind as to shove more esoteric defense questions such as the ABM out of whatever spotlight they might otherwise enjoy. There have of course been a few connections drawn between ABM's and Okinawa - allegations for example that the U. S. is considering a deployment on that island to protect both the U. S. and Japan, or is thinking of using Okinawa as a base for a SABMIS fleet, but this sort of ABM-connected comment has been quite marginal to the large number of Okinawa stories which have appeared day after day, after as well as before Prime Minister Sato's visit to the U. S.

A Sampling of Individual ABM Press Articles Worth of Note

The daily and magazine press has however carried ABM articles of mixed quality on a fairly steady basis since the U. S. announcement was made, many of them simply ringing the changes on the first batch of articles, but some of more than routine interest. Enclosures 2 and 3, from Yomiuri, for example, have been selected for transmission because they bear particularly on the questions of whether the U. S. ABM deployment will enhance or detract from the credibility of the U. S. deterrent, and whether an ABM system for Japan is needed and feasible. Enclosure 4, an article from the Japan Communist Party organ Akahata, is interesting because it is fairly well-informed in some respects, although mostly because it is a handy compendium of virtually all the allegations about U. S. evil intentions that could be dreamed up, including the contention that the U. S. is actively plotting to introduce nuclear weapons to Japan via the ABM route.

Enclosure 5, another article from Yomiuri, is worth looking at because it exemplifies what has grown into a common set of inter-connected beliefs here: that the U. S. is in a spiralling arms race with the USSR, that the Russian FOBS was probably intended to and has in any event trumped our prospective ABM system, that DDR & E Director Dr. John Foster's recent comments about the "space-bus" missile show that we are producing something intended to counter or top the FOBS; in short, that the ABM merely marked a transitory stage of an escalating tit-for-tat race with the Russians, with the super-powers competing with each other in turning space into an arena of warfare as fast as possible. In all this scenario, the fact that the U. S. ABM deployment was carefully explained just a few months ago as being virtually entirely Chinese-oriented has been forgotten.

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Enclosure 6, from Asahi, is actually a series of four articles by four different authors under the general title "Nuclear Weapons and Japan, in Connection with ABM Setup." This series ran just a few weeks ago. It is uneven in quality, has a good bit of irrelevant material in it (irrelevant, that is, from our point of view), but should be read because it shows in a clear and striking way what very great differences of view individual commentators (in this case mostly university professors) can bring to the ABM question when it is discussed here.

ABM's: Enhance or Detract from Deterrent Credibility?

The ABM question of key importance to the U. S. as far as Japan is concerned is of course that of whether the U. S. deployment will enhance or detract from the credibility of the U. S. deterrent in Japanese minds. There is comparatively little to adduce on this question so far. Some of the better-known defense analysts, Momoi and Kishida in particular, have claimed in articles that the effect will be to cause a loss of Japanese confidence in the U. S. Kei Wakaizumi, another well-known analyst, has not to Embassy knowledge written anything to this effect, but he has told the reporting officer that this is his personal view. He says that while a sophisticated person can understand and believe that the overall U. S. capability against Communist China is enhanced by ABM's, the ordinary man on the Japanese street will perceive only that the U. S. was fearful enough of China to build an ABM system against her. He will tend therefore to think that if the U. S. feared China enough to erect direct defenses against her, the U. S. could not be counted on with certainty to take on this feared antagonist if China threatened Japan. On the enhance vs. detract question, the only quasi-official view that has come to the attention of the reporting officer is that of a well-informed senior JDA official, who said in answer to a direct question that he inclined toward the view that the U. S. deployment would enhance the U. S. deterrent credibility in the minds of Japanese generally, but that it was not really possible as yet to draw any meaningful conclusion on this point.

Special ABM Issue of Defense Magazine

As indicated above, there is little to show that the ABM question has as yet penetrated very far into the general Japanese consciousness. At present, the defense analysts are still largely talking and writing to each other, or to a comparatively small defense-interested group, and are theorizing about what may happen in future. There is nevertheless considerable quiet activity going on among the experts and analysts which may prove significant over the long run. The November issue of Kokuho (National Defense) for instance, was devoted entirely to the ABM question. This magazine, with a circulation of 15-20,000, is a principal outlet for articles by defense analysts, intellectuals, and representatives

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from all the political parties who are interested in defense policy questions. While of little apparent significance in terms of numbers of readers, Kokubo is well-edited, probably reaches the majority of people who count in the defense-security field, and may therefore be a significant indication of what is trickling down from the top on ABM's.

The November issue as indicated was devoted entirely to ABM's. It led off with a translation of the Mc Namara September 18 speech, followed by two special articles "Destabilizing Factors of ABM Deployment" by Junnosuke Kishida, and "ABM Deployment and Arms Control" by Adrian Fisher. There followed an interview titled "Thin Deployment Increases Deterrent" with ACDA official Walter Deemer, and a four-part technical analysis of the missile-intercept problem and possible ABM solutions. Finally, there was a summary of US-USSR ABM development policies, a listing of ABM-related references, and an article by Jun Ishii titled "On Feasibility of Non-Nuclear ABM." The two articles by Japanese writers are transmitted as Enclosure 7.

Indications of GOJ Thinking

As distinct from non-official thinking and reactions little has surfaced indicating any line of GOJ thinking on the U. S. deployment or ABM's in general. There was no GOJ comment as such on the U. S. decision, but a senior Foreign Ministry official, understood to be Vice Minister Ushiba, did give a very interesting press backgrounder on September 20 (see Tokyo 1898 for text of Asahi story carried next day). He was quoted as saying inter alia: "On the other hand, ABM's can become a powerful nuclear deterrent against China, and from the standpoint of their purely defensive nature, discussions within our country whether this nuclear deterrent will be necessary for our country too are expected to rise in future."

In line with the tenor of this remark, the monthly Foreign Ministry periodical, "Sekai No Ugoki" (World Trends), carried an article in the December issue entitled "Nuclear Weapons, Bases and ABM's." This Foreign Ministry publication, which is printed in about 100,000 copies and distributed widely in Japan to schools, libraries, and public institutions of various kinds, is intended to bring people in Japan au courant with what the Ministry considers to be important developments abroad. The general thrust of the cited article is to point up the importance of the US-USSR nuclear balance in maintaining peace. ABM's of course constitute only one component of the nuclear armaments addressed by the article, but are mentioned specifically in the title and this conclusion:

"For us who experienced the ravages of World War II and who were defeated, the words nuclear weapons, bases, and ABM's are repulsive.

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However, it is necessary to study calmly the meanings of these things, and their relations with world peace. It is important for us, who founded the nation on trade and who depend on the seas, to think always of the world strategic setup and try to understand it."

There is nothing particular to report at this time in the way of conversations with knowledgeable Foreign Ministry or JDA officials which might cast any light on their thinking about ABM's. They have asked no significant questions of the reporting officer or to his knowledge of anyone else in the Embassy, have displayed no inclination to be drawn into conversations on the subject, and have by and large pointedly stayed off the subject when it has been offered.

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Deployment of ABM's and the Tone of the Japanese Press

KOKUBO
November issue, 1967

The tone of comments by various newspapers in Tokyo on the United States' decision on the deployment of ABM's has two characteristics. First, they are all critical, as if by common consent, of it, saying "ABM's will invite military expansion." Second, they do not touch, nearly at all, on its relation with Japan's security.

Three newspapers -- the Asahi (the 20th), Yomiuri (the 21st) and Tokyo Shimbun (the 21st) -- editorialized on this problem under the respective titles of "Throw off Nuclear Sword First," "We Cannot Support ABM Development," and "ABM Race Feared." The Asahi concluded that "Though the ABM is a defensive weapon, the relation between the ABM and the ICBM is like that between a sword and a shield. Though the United States and the Soviet Union are urging non-nuclear nations to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, how can they trust such nuclear big powers? 'Thin' ABM's will become 'thick' ABM's without fail. We urge nuclear big powers to self-reflect." The Yomiuri also concluded that "'Thin' ABM's will become 'thick' ABM's without fail. This is the start of a new nuclear arms race," and stated that "We cannot support the deployment of ABM's by the United States and the Soviet Union." The Tokyo Shimbun also took a similar stand and said that "It is a solemn duty of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to check this tendency."

Strangely enough, however, these three editorials did not touch at all on its relation with Japan's defense and security. The same was true of the commentaries in the Mainichi (the 23rd) and Sankei (the 22nd). Only the Asahi (the 26th) and Yomiuri (the 28th) took up the problem, under the titles of "American ABM Network and Japan" and "ABM's and Japan," respectively.

Simultaneously with the United States' decision on the deployment of ABM's, the Foreign Ministry tipped off the information, as a high-ranking official source's view, that "Cries for the deployment of ABM's might be raised in Japan, too." Since arguments on defensive or tactical nuclear weapons had been going on at that time, in connection with the Okinawa problem, it was taken as a "statement to expect the growth of arguments on nuclear defense" (the Sankei of the 21st). However, this expectation seems to have been ignored by the Japanese press.

When this is compared with the interest of Europe in ABM's, there is a marked difference. Last spring, the Daily Telegraph (March 4) of Britain warned, in its editorial, that "If ABM's are deployed, nuclear-holding countries of medium standing, such as Britain and France, will find that they are not treated as

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professional ballplayers, if we speak in terms of baseball; and the defense of Europe will become dependent on others, at best, and it will become impossible, in the worst case." Die Welt of West Germany also expressed fear in its commentary (March 9), saying "The offensive weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union will be neutralized because of the ABM's of the two countries, and Europe will be separated from the world strategic setup. Hence, the possibility of military aggression by conventional forces will arise, and the political value of the Soviet Forces in East Germany and Central Europe must increase."

The same can be said of Asia. The deployment of ABM's by the United States and the Soviet Union is not an event on Mars. It will prove to be an important turning point in the nuclear strategic setups of the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is all right for Japan to enjoy its economic growth in a peaceful mood under the nuclear umbrella -- it may more properly be called a nuclear hothouse-- of the United States. Is it not, however, that we should wrestle more seriously with the problem of whether the hothouse will not be broken, and also of how to cope with the situation when it has been broken and Japan has been exposed to the cold open air? We feel lonely having no newspaper comment of this kind.

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ABM Deployment Poses Problem for US Allies

By M. Makoto

Yomiuri 9/20/67

McNamara's San Francisco announcement on a Chinese-oriented ABM deployment will remain one of the most important speeches he has ever made since his classic Ann Arbor address in 1962 on the counterforce, offense-oriented US strategy.

His carefully prepared address on Monday, however, revealed nothing unexpected. For a long time, scholars, strategists and arms manufacturers in and outside the US knew too well that McNamara would sooner or later be forced to change his mind about the ABM deployment.

Last January he did tell Congress that he would not escalate the arms race with the Russians in ABM. He then explained he would also not deploy the ABM against Communist China "for the time being" because the US has a definite lead-time over China in weapon technology.

He then gave the impression that the US could wait until Peking actually enters into mass production of ICBMs--perhaps in the mid-1970s.

Now only eight months after his briefing to Congress, the defense secretary decided to deploy a "thin (or light)" ABM system against "only Chinese."

It is too obvious from his own statement Monday that his decision was spurred by the June 17 Chinese test of its first hydrogen device.

McNamara's statement in fact is a subtle confession that his systems analysts had made an error in estimating the magnitude and speed of Chinese nuclear development.

They still believe, however, their analysis is correct concerning the standing US strategy against the Russians.

McNamara Monday said he would still reply on the improved ICBM warheads (with built-in decoy or multiple smaller warheads) and advanced pen aids (penetration aids) in striking back at the Russians.

This statement clearly indicates he still believes, as his systems analysts do, that (a) Russians would not destroy, in their first strike, almost all the US retaliatory force, and (b) the US missiles, if left intact, could penetrate the Soviet ABM system.

Such assumptions are now challenged in view of drastic and quick technological progress. The Russians might explode a huge (100 megaton) warhead over the US

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continent prior to their first strike and cause short circuits of all electronic devices, including those built in the ICBMs sitting in silos.

Then the ICBMs will simply not leave the silos, if they are not destroyed.

Some Polaris submarines will survive--though this assumption is also challenged as the Russians are believed to be working on an "effective" submarine detection system.

But there is no technological assurance that those Polaris missiles could penetrate the Russian ABM systems.

All this prospect might in the near future force the defense secretary to change his mind again to choose--either the first strike strategy (or a preemptive or preventive attack) or the massive deployment of the ABM system "against Russians."

Against Chinese, the presently announced "thin" system is supposedly effective, But here again, McNamara assumes that Chinese missiles will "remain unsophisticated" or with no decoys or other pen aids.

Observers hope that he and his systems analysts are not making another, and grave, error in estimating the Chinese capability.

In fact, there is no technological assurance that the Chinese in the 1970s might not develop an effective "counter-ABM" system.

If that happens the US will be forced to deploy the same massive ABM system, supposedly effective against both Russians and Chinese.

This, however, is a problem the US must face squarely in the coming decade.

For its allies, the forthcoming "thin" ABM deployment poses a really serious problem.

It is the grave issue of whether the well-protected US would react decisively or meekly against a Chinese "suicidal act" in Asia.

Most US experts maintain that the US, with its retaliatory forces and some major cities well protected, would act decisively against Peking.

They rule out a possibility that the US would hesitate to act strongly against Chinese misconducts.

But the allies are not convinced. The US is now given by the ABM deployment an option not to act against Chinese actions in Asia.

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More importantly, if the Chinese are inclined to believe that the US would not react decisively, Peking leaders might feel relatively safe to do mischief in Asia.

If, on the other hand, the US reacts too strongly, the allies might find they are involved in a conflict of no vital interest to them.

All this prospect might eventually lead the allies to the search for an alternative to a continued reliance on the US deterrent.

They might opt for a sharing of the US ABM coverage--a kind of peripheral deployment.

For Japan, this indicates an urgent need to study the possibility of deploying a seaborne ABM system jointly with the US.

If such a need is confirmed, Japan might be forced to overhaul its standing attitude toward nuclear arms and Okinawa--the ideal site for land-based multifunctional array radars and a possible site for the Spartan antiballistic missile missile.

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YOMIURI
September 28, 1967

ABM's and Japan

First the Wall of Nuclear Problem; Doubts about the Effect
of Deployment in Japan; Technical Aspect also Doubtful

In connection with the United States' decision on the deployment of an ABM network, it is likely that arguments will also rise in Japan as to how it will affect Japan's security in the future, and also whether ABM's should be deployed or not in Japan. Hitherto, it has been believed that the world in the nuclear age can maintain stability, because the United States and the Soviet Union have nuclear missiles in large quantities, and this checks war between the two, in the form that if one side attacks, the other side will retaliate. However, ABM's will cause a change in this basic strategy, and will also affect Japan's security. This article studies problematical points in connection with "ABM's and Japan."

First of all, let us think of the deployment of ABM's in Japan. Because of the rapid progress of China's nuclear development, more concretely, in view of the situation where "China has already completed MRBM's, and it will acquire ICBM's for practical use in 1970-1972" (Report of the Joint U.S. Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy), interest in ABM's is growing among military experts.

It is a fact that the opinion is rising within the Government, with the United States' decision on the deployment of ABM's as a start, that "No definite conclusion has been drawn yet on the technical question of deploying ABM's in Japan. Also, it cannot be said that there is no possibility of some change in China's policy toward Japan in the future. At the present stage, Japan should not tie its own hands and feet by declaring that Japan will not deploy ABM's."

However, there are many big problems in deploying ABM's in Japan. What must be considered first is the plain fact that an ABM is a nuclear weapon: If an ABM system is deployed in or around Japan, its interception missiles will be fitted with nuclear warheads of the megaton class.

Though an ABM itself is a defensive weapon, such an interception missile can be used as an attack missile as it is. Also, an argument for the introduction of attack missiles may come to the fore, from the strategic point of view.

Anyhow, ABM's cannot be considered "without thinking of nuclear weapons." The first question is how it will be handled politically, and whether the national sentiment will allow it or not.

Apart from the political and sentimental question, there are two questions when viewed from the technical point of view. One is whether ABM's will be

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effective for Japan, and the other is how to construct an ABM system.

As regards the first question, that is, the effectiveness of ABM's, Japan's geographic conditions are extremely disadvantageous for the deployment of ABM's. There are two reasons for this, that is, Japan lies at a short distance from the continent, and it will be impossible to predict as to from what direction an attack will be made.

The first reason, that is, Japan is located near the continent, means that, IRBM's with a range of about 2,000 kilometers will be used in a missile attack on Japan, and, though the time needed from firing to arrival will differ according to the speed of missiles, it will be about ten minutes or ten-odd minutes, at most.

Speaking of the United States' ABM system against ICBM's for comparison's sake, it will consist of radar in three-fold array and interception missiles in two-fold array. First long-range PAR (perimeter air search radar) will catch the warhead of an enemy missile at a distance of about 4,000 kilometers, or 14 or 15 minutes before its arrival. When the missile approaches about 3,000 kilometers, or about 10 minutes before its arrival, a Spartan long-range interception missile will be fired. When the enemy missile approaches about 1,000 kilometers, the radar will be switched to MAR (multiple-array radar capable of undertaking identification of a target and guidance of an interception missile), which will guide the Spartan to the warhead of the enemy missile and detonate it about 2 minutes before the latter's arrival, at an altitude of several hundred kilometers. If the Spartan misses the enemy missile, MSR (missile site radar) will track it and a Sprint short-range interception missile will be fired to intercept it at an altitude of 30-40 kilometers.

Radar will detect a warhead for the first time at a distance of 4,000 kilometers. However, in the case of Japan, an IRBM will cover a distance of 2,000 kilometers in ten or ten-odd minutes. If its range is 2,000 kilometers, the apogee of its trajectory will be about 1,000 kilometers. If its time of flight is 14 minutes, it will reach the apogee in seven minutes after firing. It will be during one or two minutes around that time, when radar can catch its warhead. Compared with the United States' ABM's, the first stage of PAR must be excluded.

Moreover, if such a missile is fitted with plural warheads, such as those being developed by the United States and the Soviet Union, interception will become even more difficult.

Direction of Attack Cannot Be Predicted

As for the second question, that is, the prediction as to a direction, ABM's have directivity. For instance, according to the British Strategic Research Institute's recent report, the Soviet Union's ABM's now being deployed near

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The U. S. side is also thinking of the deployment of ABM's in Europe and Japan, and its cost is estimated at from \$3 billion to \$12 billion in the case of Europe, and \$2 billion in the case of Japan. Also, the U. S. Navy has a plan for the construction of an ABM fleet, whereby ABM's will be carried by large-size submarines and surface vessels. The plan aims at a double purpose -- early interception of ICBM's aimed at the United States and the defense of its allies -- by deploying such a fleet along the coasts of the Soviet Union and China. It will not constitute, to be sure, the "bringing in of nuclear weapons."

There also is the argument that deployment in neighboring countries will help prevent nuclear proliferation. For instance, India could be dissuaded from arming itself with nuclear weapons by constructing ABM's against China. However, in such a case, the problem of sharing expenses, which are expected to reach several billion dollars, will be inevitable.

Only US and USSR Will Acquire Outstanding Strength

There is a view that the deployment of ABM's by the United States will be a plus to Japan's security, and there is another view that it will be a minus.

The former says that "Since there will be no need for the United States to worry about China's nuclear attack, if China threatens Japan, the United States will retaliate on China without fail. Therefore, the power to check an attack from China has increased." The latter says that "It denies America's hitherto-adopted view that nuclear weapons can check war, and a nation's security cannot be entrusted to this nuclear deterrent power."

We will have to watch the future development to judge as to which is correct. However, it seems to be a fact that the cautious view that only the United States and the Soviet Union will come to rank even higher in nuclear war potential, and Europe will become a military vacuum area, is predominant in Europe.

(Reporter ISHII, International Situation Research Council)

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AKAHATA (Organ of the Japan Communist Party)
September 27, 1967

America's Plan for ABM Network and Japan

Will Pave the Way for Bringing Nuclear Weapons into Japan:
Also Deploy ABM Fleet along Japan Sea Coast?: Nuclear
Intimidation Policy Will Be Strengthened Further

U. S. Secretary of Defence MC NAMARA on the 18th announced that the United States decided on the deployment of ABM's, on the pretext of "coping with China's rapid development of nuclear striking power." Then, on the 22nd, the U. S. Department of Defense published part of its ABM deployment plan, and clarified that a "thin network" of 15 or 20 ABM's will be stationed throughout the United States. On the other hand, there is a plan, in this connection, to deploy an ABM fleet near the coast of Japan and Okinawa; and it is said that the Japanese Government has been positively holding consultations with the U. S. authorities on the deployment of ABM's. Acting in concert with it, a high official source of the Japanese Foreign Ministry has also said that "We will study if it is the bringing in of nuclear weapons for defense." The problem of bringing nuclear weapons into Japan is acquiring greater importance, with the ABM problem as a start.

Interception outside U. S. Mainland

An ABM fleet, which is said to be planned for deployment along the coast of Japan, will be stationed outside the Nike X system (general term for the interception missile, or ABM, weapons system being developed by the United States as a defensive weapon against ICBM's), which the United States is developing now. This plan is intended to intercept "enemy" ICBM's as far away from the U. S. mainland as possible. It will carry on board missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads into ultra-high altitudes for interception, radar to detect ICBM's, and all other equipment. It will be able to move to any necessary place.

Since ABM's will be fitted with nuclear warheads in order to destroy the nuclear warheads of enemy ICBM's by nuclear destructive power, if they are stationed on the U. S. mainland, casualties among its own people will be inevitable. Hence, they have been studying a setup to intercept at a distant point from the U. S. mainland, and the deployment of ABM's on board ships and also in various regions other than the U. S. mainland has been planned, together with their deployment on the U. S. mainland.

It is clear from the statement of Democratic Representative ANDERSON, ex-commanding officer of the nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus, which said, "Nuclear-powered submarines with ABM's on board may possibly appear in the Artic Ocean in the future," that an ABM fleet is now under study (AP on the 8th).

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This ABM fleet is intended to protect American military bases abroad and also to "defend" its "allies" by its "nuclear umbrella," in order to provide a feeling of "assurance" under the pretext of "ensuring security," thereby legalizing the export of nuclear weapons into other countries.

New Nuclear Arms Race

Though the U. S. Government authorities make an excuse that it is meant to cope with "China's nuclear striking power," the development and deployment of an ABM system means not only defensive interception, but also the strengthening of the ability and setup capable of delivering missiles to an "enemy country," on the contrary, thereby providing an opportunity for a new nuclear arms race.

The deployment of ABM's by U. S. imperialism is a weapon of intimidation, which is intended to carry out the policy of destroying socialist countries and national liberation movements, one after another, such as from the aggression in Vietnam to that on the Korean Democratic People's Republic, as well as to strengthen further the policy of aggression by nuclear threat, while carrying out an "appeasement policy" with the Soviet Union, including the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" and the Glassboro Conference, on the one hand, and evading direct confrontation with China, in spite of its pretext "against China," on the other hand.

A recent issue of "Aviation Week," an American professional magazine on aviation, clarifies that the U. S. Navy has in mind the coast of Japan along the Japan Sea, Okinawa, and Midway as areas for the deployment of this ABM fleet against China's ICBM's.

The Magazine reports, as the view of the U. S. Navy authorities, that "Since an ABM fleet will be mobile, it can be used for the defense of key military bases other than those in the United States and also of its allied and neutral countries. Especially, it can be stationed in the Japan Sea or elsewhere at the request of Japan, separately from the U. S. Forces' own judgment, against China's attack with ICBM's. An ABM fleet will also serve the promotion of the United States' international diplomacy."

Consultations with the U. S. for Bringing-in of Nuclear Weapons

It has been made clear that the Japanese Government takes positive interest in U. S. imperialism's such nuclear intimidation policy, and that it is holding consultations with the U. S. Government, in an attempt to bring nuclear weapons into Japan, openly. According to a New York Times dispatch from Washington dated July 6, U. S. Defense Department and State Department sources clarified the fact that the Japanese Government had been seeking various information from the United States on ABM's, in order to cope with "China's nuclear development," and that consultations were being held between

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Japan and the United States on this problem. It also reported that the sources said, "That the Japanese Government has been holding talks seriously on nuclear weapons itself shows the Japanese side's view on nuclear weapons, and this merits attention."

The newspaper also reported, as a Defense Department source's statement, that "The Japanese side has been given explanations in detail on the trend of China's nuclear development and also on America's Nike X ABM system, for the last few months; and 'frank views' are being exchanged on a wide range of strategic problems." The newspaper pointed out that the Japanese side is paying particular attention to the fact that, as a result of the U. S. Army's private research, it reached the conclusion that "If an ABM system is deployed at a total cost of about \$2 billion for the defense of Japan against China's attack with ballistic missiles, effective interception will be possible."

The newspaper also reported that the U. S. authorities clarified that Japan's authorities in charge of defense and diplomacy, especially those of medium standing, called on the former frequently and asked questions about the Nike X, and that the former stated, "They have clarified that this kind of interest extends to the highest echelon of the Japanese Government." Such Japanese visitors have also sought information on the U. S. Navy's research, which is intended to "carry Nike X ballistic missiles on board ships" (ABM fleet), too.

Though a JDA source says, on the report that the Japanese Government was beginning to take strong interest in the Nike X nuclear interception missile, that "Japan is not considering to possess the Nike X," he admits that "It is a fact that Japan is trying to deepen its understanding on America's Nike X nuclear interception missile, against China, its neighbor, which is hastening nuclear development."

ABM's attract serious attention as weapons of intimidation for the divide-and-rule policy toward Asia, as well as weapons to open the way for bringing nuclear weapons into Japan.

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Yomiuri
November 5, 1967

Soviet Union's "Orbital Bomb" Will Accelerate Military Expansion

Even "ABM's" Will Become Powerless: Defensive Weapons Will Become Increasingly Expensive

U. S. Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA announced, in a press conference on the 3rd, that "The Soviet Union is continuing tests on a 'fractional orbital bombardment system' (FOBS), and it will be put to practical use even within next year, at the earliest." The FOBS will be a new military technique not only to upset the present concept of ABM's from the ground up, but also to turn space into a place for military use. It will also prove to be a start of an arms race in space between the United States and the Soviet Union. The ABM deployment race has caused a crack in the stability of the world, which remained stable for several years before that based on the balance of nuclear war potential between the United States and the Soviet Union. The "orbital bomb" may widen the crack further.

What is the Soviet Union's "fractional orbital bombardment system?" Look at the drawing at the right. An ICBM of today flies the shortest course from the launching point to a target, drawing a ballistic curve. For instance, in case of an attack from the Soviet Union against the United States, an ICBM will cover a distance of about 8,000-10,000 kilometers across the Arctic Ocean, in 30-40 minutes, with its highest altitude reaching 1,000-1,500 kilometers.

On the other hand, the "orbital bomb" will be launched aimed at an orbit of an artificial satellite about 160 kilometers high, and it will go round the earth like an ordinary artificial satellite. Its retro-rocket will be ignited when it approaches a target, and then it will attack the target area. Its flying distance will be 20,000-30,000 kilometers and time of flight will be from one hour to 70 minutes, in the case of a "flight via the south."

Several "advantages" are conceivable, compared with an ICBM. First, it will be easy to make a surprise attack, because it cannot be distinguished from an ordinary artificial satellite during its flight. According to Secretary MC NAMARA, its retro-rocket will be ignited at a distance of 800 kilometers from a target area, or only three minutes before its arrival at the target, in terms of time. Furthermore, its speed will be four-five kilometers per second, and its speed immediately before its arrival will be about 50% greater than that of the warhead of an ICBM.

The size of the bomb is said to be from one to three megatons. This is small compared with the Soviet Union's ICBM's which range between seven and twenty megatons. However, it will be possible to increase the size of the bomb, if the Soviet Union's techniques for unmanned docking, which proved successful

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recently, are used. It will open the way to a full-scale space weapon, which will go round the earth all the time, in the future.

Anyhow, this will make the ABM network being conceived by the United States powerless. This is because the present ABM concept is to detect a missile from the Soviet Union with radar, at a distance of about 4,000 kilometers, or about 14-15 minutes before arrival in terms of time, and to calculate its orbit in order to fire an interception missile and guide it; and it will not be able to meet a surprise attack from an artificial satellite. What is more important is that, though it is possible to predict as to from what direction ICBM's will come flying -- in fact, the United States has already deployed ballistic missile early warning systems (BMEWS) in Greenland, Alaska and Britain, BMEWS' will be powerless against an "orbital bomb" approaching from South America.

They say that it will cost the United States \$40 billion to construct ABM's against the Soviet Union. The greater part of the amount will be spent on radar. If the United States is to build warning systems in all directions against "orbital bombs," on the same plan as for ABM's, the expenses involved will be very great.

The United States has the "Defender Plan," as a defensive weapon against "orbital bombs." According to the Plan, if a "suspicious" satellite is discovered, the United States will launch a reconnaissance satellite and have it approach the former using the techniques for a rendezvous, or connect it with the former by using the techniques for docking, in order to identify it. In this connection, Secretary of State RUSK testified before the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 7 this year, that "The United States has systems capable of finding whether artificial satellites in space are carrying nuclear weapons or not." It is said, however, that this weapons system is still in the stage of research, as a whole. Moreover, since the orbital bomb will be able to fire several decoy satellites during its flight, with ease, this kind of "detection" will contain considerable difficulty, as a matter of fact.

Difficult to Ban Orbital Bombs under the Space Treaty?

From the technical point of view, it can be said that the "orbital bomb" shows that the Soviet Union's level of space technology is very high. In other words, whether an "orbital bomb" can hit a target or not depends on the timing to ignite its retro-rocket and also on an error in speed at that time. On this point, the techniques shown in the soft landing of Venus-4 on Venus and the successful unmanned docking of space ships of late endorse this "orbital bomb," technically.

For instance, suppose a rocket traveling from the earth to Venus at a speed of 11.2 kilometers per second. If there is an error of six meters per second, the rocket will be 400,000 kilometers away from Venus when it approaches Venus closest. In order to effect a soft landing on Venus whose radius is

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6,000 kilometers, an error must be below 9 centimeters. Accuracy required is 9 m/11.2 km, or 1/100,000. The Soviet Union's Venus-4 achieved it successfully. The United States' Mariner-5, which approached Venus almost at the same time with Venus-4, passed through a point 4,000 kilometers from Venus. It is calculated that its error in speed was over 15 centimeters per second.

With this speed and accuracy and also the guidance techniques capable of automatically docking unmanned artificial satellites in space, it will be easy to drop an "orbital bomb" on a target of a certain size, such as a city or an airfield, even though it may not be as accurate as an ICBM.

The Soviet Union produces from 100 to 200 ICBM's each year, and there is a report that "The situation of transportable nuclear warheads between the United States and the Soviet Union will be reversed in 1971, in terms of megatons." The Soviet Union started the deployment of ABM's first. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the United States' expenditures on the Vietnam war are affecting adversely the progress of science and technics.

Under the circumstances, it is anticipated that a cry will become strong within the United States for resumption of the development of "orbital bombs," which has been suspended for some time, or for promotion of the Defender Plan. It will be a new arms race in space. It will contain technical difficulty in interception and, financially, it will cost several times more than the present ABM network against the Soviet Union.

If so, the gaps between the United States and the Soviet Union and other medium nuclear nations, such as Britain, France, and China, will increase and become fixed. It is believed that the deployment of ABM's will bring about a military vacuum in Europe, etc., and pose a threat. The attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union will have to be studied sufficiently, hereafter, in relation to the appearance of an "orbital bomb" and its influence on the world strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and also on Japan's security.

In his press interview, Secretary MC NAMARA evaded an answer to the question, "Does it constitute a violation of the Treaty on Space and Celestial Bodies?" A big reason for this is said to be that the United States does not have sufficient data to condemn that the "fractional orbital bombardment system" is a violation of the Treaty.

Moreover, the Space Treaty does not prohibit "technical tests concerning the delivery of objects into orbits or the dropping thereof on specific targets on the ground."

Also, a clear definition of "space" is yet to be made hereafter. On the other hand, the interpretation that "It cannot be said to be in space unless

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an object remains in an orbit (more than one revolution)" has been established.

In other words, the Soviet Union's "orbital bomb" cannot be called a "space weapon," if it is dropped before completing a revolution around the earth. However, is it not that what is more necessary than an interpretation of the Treaty is the spirit of "common interests of all mankind," which is mentioned in the Preamble of the Treaty?

(Reporter ISHII of the International Situation Research Society and Reporter OGAWA in Washington)

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ASAHI
December 4, 1967

Nuclear Weapons and Japan; In Connection with ABM Setup (Part 1)

By Toyoyuki SAMEDA, Assistant Professor at Kyoto Prefectural Medical College
(History of Western Culture)

The recently announced "Report Concerning Effects of Nuclear Weapons" of the UN Expert Committee (U THANT Report) says that it is open to question to heighten political independence and dignity by nuclear weapons, and urges the need to prevent nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, the big powers' nuclear race is still continuing, and with the appearance of ABM's (missile-intercepting missiles), the "nuclear stalemate" was broken, and there are some who even observe that a new race for developing nuclear weapons may start. In the midst of this, how should Japan, which expressed the decision to stay a non-nuclear nation, cope with this? This press asked four persons, who have respectively different positions, to write about their views. We want to make their views as an opening to think about the nuclear problem.

Nuclear Allergy and View of War; U. S. and Europe Firmly Convinced in Defense

Recently, the Japanese people's "nuclear allergy" is becoming a problem everywhere. Not only among the Europeans and Americans, but among the Japanese also, there are not a few people who urge overcoming of the nuclear allergy. Their assertion is that, though Japan is the only nation in the world, which was a victim of atomic bombs, it will not be able to cope with international society in the future, if it is engrossed in "nuclear allergy" forever.

Frankly speaking, I do not want to agree to this argument. I am rather thinking whether it is not possible for all peoples in the world to be infected with nuclear allergy, just as the Japanese, and to abolish totally nuclear armaments.

However, it does not seem to be possible, actually. Over 20 years ago, the U. S. was the only nation which was armed with nuclear weapons, but at present, as many as five nations, including the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Communist China, have nuclear weapons. Besides these, Switzerland and Italy have an intention to arm themselves with such weapons. When the destructive power of nuclear weapons keeps increasing, prevention of nuclear proliferation is not at all possible. There are too many nations which have nothing to do with nuclear allergy.

Then, why is the repercussion against nuclear armaments weak in these nations, and why can we not see nuclear allergy there? Is there no method to drive these nations into nuclear allergy?

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Here, we face the fact that views on nuclear weapons are completely in contrast between the Japanese and the Europeans and Americans. Generally, the Japanese think that if a nuclear war breaks out, mankind cannot but be ruined. Europeans and Americans do not necessarily think that way. The best example is the U. S. decision to deploy an ABM network on the American Continent. In its decision, there is a deep-rooted idea that it is not totally impossible to prevent an attack by nuclear weapons.

However, it is not that all Europeans and Americans are thinking that it is possible to check attacks by nuclear weapons. This is clear from the Report prepared by the UN Expert Committee on effects of nuclear weapons. It intently stresses that there is absolutely no relief in a nuclear war.

However, the mood of the general public must be different. The conviction among them that there is a way to survive a nuclear attack cannot be wiped out. Is it not that the recent U. S. decision to deploy an ABM network is based on this way of thinking?

In this case, however, it is not correct to observe that the mood of Europeans and Americans in general was created from their confidence in defensive nuclear weapons called ABM's. Since before the development of ABM's, a nuclear war and ruin of mankind have not necessarily been connected with each other. They think that if a nuclear war breaks out, they can survive, somehow or other, only if they build solid shelters.

To begin with, Europeans and Americans had incomparably sharper interest in defense than that of the Japanese, even before the nuclear age set in. There is an example of a fine classic writing entitled "Idea of War" by the famous German strategist CLAUSEWITZ of the early 19th century. Saying that no matter how an attack is made, he said that there will be no war if no one resists; he also asserted the proposition that a "war starts from defense." This argument sounds considerably strange, but his aim was to seek the substance of war in defense and to attach importance to a defense setup rather than an offensive setup.

Historically speaking, defensive weapons attained marked development in Europe in old times. Especially, arms of feudal knights of the 14th and the 15th centuries were masterpieces. Helmets were open only at a place where there are eyes, so as not to be penetrated by improved strong arrows, as if they were iron masks, and the bodies, arms and legs were completely covered with thick iron plates. Though they were designed so that joints of arms and legs could be moved, knights wore armor which weighed as much as 60 to 80 kilograms.

At any rate, their tenacity for defensive weapons was terrible. In Japan of the past, there was a time when people went to the front, armed with armor but it cannot be compared with the feudal age in Europe. Is it not that CLAUSEWITZ

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was able to develop that theory of war centering on defense because this tenacity for defensive weapons still survived to his time, changing its dimension only?

In other words, from the old time to the nuclear age of today, Europeans' interest in defense has never been lost. They could not understand the position of the Japanese of the past who mixed up offense and defense, saying: "The offense is the best defense." For Europeans and Americans, offense and defense are completely separate things, and they have had the persistent posture that there is no offensive weapons which cannot be defended against. The appearance of nuclear weapons, which are said to be ultimate weapons, did not go as far as shake up this posture of theirs, sharply.

In this sense, if atomic bombs had exploded over the skies of the U. S. or nations in Europe, not in the skies of Japan, the circumstances might have been completely different. If that happened, it is very questionable as to whether Americans and Europeans would still continue to have the idea that nuclear weapons can possibly be defended against.

However, we cannot overestimate the results of this "if." To begin with, when Europeans and Americans think that there can be no offensive weapons which cannot be defended against, they are not thinking of 100% defense. They rather have the confidence that they can limit damage, if they resort to every means. If this is true, it will not at all be possible to drive the U. S. and other European nations into a nuclear allergy.

Under such circumstances, it will no longer be possible for the Japanese to cling to the nuclear allergy all alone, forever. It is not completely convincing for myself, somehow or other, but it may be necessary for Japan to overcome its nuclear allergy, in order to survive in international society. The question is, however, whether or not the Japanese will be able to overcome nuclear allergy in a true sense.

It is not that nuclear allergy will vanish when Japan decides to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Most important is a way of thinking that it is possible to defend against even a nuclear war. Is it possible for the Japanese to assimilate such a way of thinking as their own?

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ASAHI
December 5, 1967

Nuclear Weapons and Japan; In Connection with ABM Setup (Part 2)

By Tadashi KAWADA, Professor at Tokyo University (International economy)

Economic Meaning of Nuclear Weapons - Unlimited Burdens which Deprive People of Their Life

The amounts of money and efforts the present world is throwing into preparations for a war are so enormous as not to be calculated at once. Increasing military expenses heavily press the burdens on peoples in general, and military armaments of a quick tempo are putting the war industry into confusion, and it is now even feared that this may lead business circles into big confusion. It is terrible that the vicious cycle has come this far.

At the time when the UN Secretary General announced the report in 1962 entitled "Effects of Armaments on Economy and Society," in order to remove this anxiety, the military expenses of the world were estimated to be about \$120 billion a year. However, it is said that the military expenses amount to as much as \$150 billion, now.

The intense arms race has no longer been a phenomenon seen in the north world alone. Numerous kinds of ordinary modern weapons, including missiles, are being sold and transferred from the U. S., the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden to newly-emerging nations.

For example, since 1945, weapons which have flowed into the Middle East include over 1,500 jets, about 2,800 tanks, and 31 warships, and weapons which have flowed into south Asia (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan) include about 1,000 jets, about 800 tanks, and 33 warships. These modern weapons danced wildly in the India-Pakistani war and in the Arab-Israeli war recently.

The most ironical thing about the inflow of ordinary weapons to newly-rising nations is that the U. S., the Soviet Union, and Britain, which are in concert concerning prevention of nuclear proliferation, are most enthusiastic about it, and are continuing large-scale plans for it.

It is said that in ten years to come, demand on the international weapon market for military aircraft and missiles will amount to about \$35 billion, of which, \$8 billion will be used by newly-rising nations only. However, this is not all of the problem, because newly-rising nations also have an intention to bring up a war industry of their own.

For example, India, whose State, Bihar, issued the "starvation declaration" this April for the first time since its independence, is now developing

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E-300 jet engines jointly with the United Arab Republic, and both countries have already succeeded in flying super-sonic jet planes. The Republic of South Africa also said that it will have ability to manufacture domestic jet fighters shortly, and Israel, which has emphasized production of small firearms, has already been exporting equipment in part.

Now, Israel's military expenditures exceed 11% of its gross national product. This is a really heavy economic burden, in the light of any standard. Besides, it is said that the view is coming to the fore, taking this from the reverse side, that if Israel will have to bear this burden continuously, anyway, it is more favorable for the country to take a direction of establishing nuclear potential from a long-range viewpoint.

It is true that the elaborate and modern ordinary weapons system is expensive, and the higher its quality, the easier to establish and maintain nuclear potential. The reason is that bombers, missiles, and rockets can be convertible to a means to deliver nuclear weapons, and on the other hand, with the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, it is becoming easier for various nations to have elementary nuclear proliferation and nuclear multiplication.

The meaning of the UN Secretary General's announcement of the Expert Report (U THANT Report) on effects of nuclear weapons, as a part of the "over-all and complete disarmament," on October 24, exactly lies in the following points.

According to Part 2 of the Report, \$1.7 billion will be needed for obtaining a "small-scale" nuclear potential of 30 to 50 jet bombers and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) equipped with plutonium atomic bombs in ten years, and this is \$170 million a year. Also, it is said that it will cost \$5.6 billion to own small-scale but high quality nuclear potential to be armed with hydrogen bombs, such as 10 to 15 bombers in the first five years, and in the second five years, 100 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and two atomic-powered submarines to be equipped with missiles. This is \$560 million on an annual average.

However, it is diagrammed in the Report that at present, six nations, besides the nuclear-holding big five nations, spend over \$560 million a year in military expenses, and there are as many as 20 nations (a total of 31 nations) which spend over \$170 million.

This should be taken as a serious warning toward the present world. To begin with, the reason for this warning is that nuclear-holding big powers have virtually suspended international discussions on nuclear disarmament to engage themselves in the furious nuclear arms race, and in the midst of this, nuclear proliferation is progressing. However, at any rate, nuclear proliferation is progressing. However, at any rate, nuclear proliferation will only quicken a coming of a day when the world is annihilated by the hands of men themselves, causing, on the other hand, an enormous economic loss.

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Though it is no longer impossible for a considerable number of nations to have "small-scale" nuclear armaments, actually, as the recent Report points out, economic burdens will endlessly increase, because nuclear armaments always demand up-to-date forms, not only demanding resources and many scientists and technicians, who are inevitable for improvement of livelihood, for military purposes. This will be duly proved by remembering the U. S. announcement on September 18 on construction of a "thin" ABM system, and its earmarking \$5 billion for its construction, and also its estimate of \$40 billion for construction of a "thick" ABM system.

At this time when less-developed nations have many economic difficulties and when it is the situation whereby it is not too much to say that military expenses will carry off lives due to starvation, nations in the world are throwing precious resources into military armaments, and nuclear multiplication and nuclear proliferation are going to make progress. The problem of how to settle this problem is clearly a problem of political awareness and decision.

Today when it is very clear that in the near future, atomic energy will take the place of coal and oil, as an energy resource, the security and welfare of the world will not be guaranteed, unless a path to nuclear armaments is tightly shut, and all-out efforts are devoted to peaceful uses of atomic energy and to its thoroughgoing maintenance and management. For Japan, which has determined to stay a non-nuclear nation, when it has the ability to have nuclear weapons, the role it will play in the international arena on this problem is great, and I think that we should carve in our minds again that the peoples of the world are attaching strong expectations on us.

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ASAHI
December 6, 1967

Nuclear Weapons and Japan; In Connection with ABM Setup (Part 3)

By Kiichi SAEKI, President of Nomura Over-All Research Association

Moves of Nuclear Technical Development; No absolute Guarantee for Peace

The recent technical progress of the nuclear weapons system can be represented by (1) ABM system; (2) system for collecting, adjusting and communicating timely data on enemies' attacks and defense; (3) multi-warhead missiles, and (4) marked improvement of hitting accuracy of attacks by missiles and accident rates. The Soviet Union's partial orbital bombs can be added to these; this is substantially improvement of their breakthrough ability at the cost of hitting accuracy.

The basic elements which brought about these technical developments are electronic computers and high density accumulation circuits. Electronic computers are indispensable in designing a nuclear weapon system, and at the same time, they become an important component of the designed system. The brain of the inertia guidance system which directs ICBM's toward an attack target is a high efficiency electronic computer, and this is also inevitable for radar of an ABM system and intercepting missiles, which bring down ICBM's. The marked improvement in the speed, cost, size, and accident rates of the electronic computers is largely dependent on the techniques of the high density accumulation circuit. This does not only reduce the size and the cost of the component, but also, this improves accident rates of the whole system. Due to this, improvement of the efficiency of an ABM system and the cost became possible.

These technical improvements caused effects on each other, and improved the hitting accuracy of attacks by nuclear weapons and accident rates; thus, it became possible to load a number of warheads on a single missile. Electronic computers which are installed inside a missile will decrease errors in guidance. Man-made satellites will decrease errors by geodetic surveys and provide accurate information on attack targets. Besides, as the guidance missiles will become light and also as a ratio between power and weight of the war-head will be improved, it will become possible to load a missile with plural warheads. These technical improvements will bring about sharp changes in strategy. Improving the hitting accuracy of missiles by ten times and increasing the explosive power of warheads by 1,000 times are the same as increasing an amount of nuclear missile weapons over the former performance by 100 times. Roughly speaking, the hitting accuracy of missiles has been improved by 10 times in the past ten years. From the above-stated consideration, it is possible to say as follows:

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1. The improvement of attacking ability of an nuclear weapons system has changed for the better on the attacking side. However, the U. S. is pursuing the strategy of not permitting the other side to have the ability to deal the first attack, in return for its not having the ability of the first attack (ability of delivering a forestalling attack on the other side and of deproving the other side of its ability to resort to an attack in retaliation). Even after the U. S. is dealt the first attack, it must check a deliberate nuclear attack against the U. S. or its allies, by maintaining highly dependable ability to inflict unbearable damage on an invader.

Therefore, in response to a tendency to strengthen striking power, security of positive attacking ability becomes a question. An increase in a number of positive attacking ability becomes a question. An increase in a number of firing missiles does not only mean an increase in the first attack ability, but this will be very expensive, and therefore, this is not desirable. This is unstable and also provocative. Besides, the other side is improving its attacking power at such a quick tempo that it is not effective to strengthen underground sheltering facilities and defend its own nuclear attack ability; this is not economical, either. In short, it will be economical to defend ICBM's, which are defended underground, by an ABM system. In parallel with this, strengthening of multi-faceted war-heads is being pushed in order to increase the number of warheads, without increasing the number of missiles.

2. An ABM system of the U. S. is being considered for the citizens' defense which is limited auxiliarily. It is possible to develop a light ABM system for the protection of U. S. citizens from missile attacks, such as missile attacks to be made by Communist China by mistake, and also other accidental missile attacks. It is not considered that defense has become so advantageous as it is possible to develop an ABM system to protect the U. S. citizens from a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.

3. Furthermore, it is considered that a light ABM system will be able to increase the value of public pledges which the U. S. has committed to its allied nations, or friendly nations on the U. S. If it is possible to defend the majority of the American citizens for 15 or 20 years from now (not causing a loss of more than one million lives) from Communist China's nuclear attacks calculating from an expected scale and performance of Communist China's nuclear armaments, the U. S. will be able to exercise its nuclear attack ability without fear that the country will suffer damage, and this will certainly increase the confidence of Asian nations in the U. S. nuclear deterrence.

If our country cannot be free from Communist China's nuclear threat unless we are armed with nuclear weapons, a light ABM system can be welcome. However, we may want at the next stage to defend ourselves with an ABM system.

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The question is whether or not we may be able to do so, without lowering the dependability of the U. S. nuclear deterrence.

4. The U. S. decision to develop a light ABM system will not seriously change the balance of power between the U. S. and the Soviet Union and their arms race. The Soviet Union had decided to develop an ABM system on the premise of the situation in 1961 and 1962 when it was not possible to expect today's situation in the development of nuclear techniques. Neither the U. S. nor the Soviet Union considers it is wise to develop ABM systems further for the defense of cities in the future. Also, it is possible to find whether or not the other side has started construction of a high ABM system for the defense of cities. They have surplus ability to watch the other side's moves. Furthermore, there are big differentials in resources, which can be used, and especially, in techniques between the U. S. and the Soviet Union and other nuclear-holding nations. Therefore, it is not possible for the U. S. and the Soviet Union to become so weak as to be attacked by nuclear weapons held by other nuclear-holding nations, and also, they will be able to maintain their positions without being driven into the nuclear arms race which will be accelerated spirally.

From 1961 to 1967, the nuclear strategic setup of the U. S. has seen marked improvement, but the amount of budget for it was reduced by one third, on the contrary. If the cost for an ABM system increases to some extent, a spiral nuclear arms race will not possibly start. Judging from the present situation of resources and techniques of the U. S. and the Soviet Union, it will not be possible for either of the two to surpass the other side decisively. At present, the U. S. and the Soviet Union respectively have the ability to launch about 4,000 and about 1,000 warheads against the other side, respectively. However, the two countries are in an equal position in that either of them has the ability to deal the first attack.

Partial orbital bombs of the Soviet Union cannot either upset this relationship. Their rate of hits is low, and the weight of warheads to be loaded is also limited. They are not suitable for destroying an ICBM and they are wasteful for attacking cities. They are suitable for attacking airports, but it will cost too much to destroy 40 airports in the U. S. Interception will also become possible. They are not worthy, for the U. S., of having them. The U. S.-Soviet arms race can be permissible when prospects for nuclear disarmament are dark, so long as it is continued in not a dangerous situation. The problem lies in that no one can guarantee that the race can be withheld with the permissible scope.

5. The trend of technical development of nuclear weapons has widened the distance between the U. S. and the Soviet Union which are the nuclear-holding big powers, and other nuclear-holding nations. This tendency has sharpened the sense of powerlessness of non-nuclear holding nations and checked them from approaching nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it is also difficult to pursue the dignity of nations, which do not have nuclear weapons, and wipe out their anxiety. However, the grim reality which we should realize is that it is not

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possible to secure absolutely positive nuclear security, by either of our having nuclear armaments, or regional multi-faceted nuclear armaments, or by dependence on the U. S. nuclear deterrence. Relatively, it is far better to come under the U. S. nuclear deterrence, and we should be contented with it. Also, if we understand that, different from any time in military history, the predominance of nuclear weapons cannot be effectively converted to political control or diplomatic means, it is not necessary for us to be worried that we may lose political independence by depending on the U. S. nuclear deterrence.

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ASAHI
December 7, 1967

Nuclear Weapons and Japan; In Connection with ABM Setup (Part 4-Conclusion)

By Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO, Professor at Tokyo University (International politics)

Myth of Defense and Philosophy of Superiority; ABM's Have No Deterrence

With the period from the Cuban crisis in 1962 to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the year following it, as the peak, the image came to dominate the world that the race for developing ultimate weapons has levelled off. And the myth that the "balance of nuclear missiles maintains peace" has spread. However, because of the U. S. decision in September to deploy an ABM system, this image started to waver, and the color of anxiety has deepened even among persons who advocate the idea of nuclear deterrent. By saying so, I do not mean to say that ABM's made their debut as an epoch-making ultimate weapon. It is the reverse. In other words, it is not that ABM's are important because they posed a new problem, but they are important because they brought to the fore the reality of the old problem having become worse before it was even settled, whether we like it or not.

First, it is necessary to note the fact that the propaganda that "ABM's are defensive weapons and they are different from ICBM's which are offensive weapons" is meaningless. Far from ABM's reducing the offensive character of the nuclear strategic setup, in which ICBM's are the pillar, they will make it still more offensive. This is true from the following two points:

1. First, ABM's are offensive weapons viewed from the other side. For example, if the U.S. attacks the Soviet Union with ICBM's in forestallment, and if the U. S. is able to intercept ICBM's fired by the Soviet Union with an ABM system to a certain degree, this means that it becomes easier for the U. S. to make a forestalling attack, and therefore, it cannot be helped if the Soviet Union were to regard the whole U. S. strategic setup as having increased its offensive power to that degree.

2. Next, the defensive effectiveness of an ABM system is low from the U. S. side's viewpoint. It is a "thin ABM system" that was recently decided to be deployed, but it is said that this system is good enough to counter China's ICBM's for the time being. If so, however, China may shift its emphasis from ICBM's to, for example, submarines, and take the method of having them go through the loopholes of the ABM network. Needless to say, with "thin network" cannot be useful defense against the Soviet Union. Even though it is not useful for defense, it is somewhat useful for blocking attacks from the Soviet Union. If this is true, this will rather drive the Soviet Union to strengthen its attack power, and this will make the U. S. defense more useless. There is no guarantee

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that weapons which intercept ABM's and destroy them will not be developed. ABM's are meaningless as a defensive weapon in that they will increase the other side's attack power more than heighten its own defensive power.

Therefore, ABM's will only worsen the old problem called the arms race, further. Besides, it is questionable how far forces within the U. S., which loudly call for deployment of an ABM system, have confidence in the defensive ability of an ABM system. They have no idea how effective is the Talin Line ABM network which has already been deployed in the Soviet Union. Concerning the ABM system of the U. S., also, it is at the stage where some people say that because its effects are not known clearly, unless a nuclear bomb is launched into outer-space and exploded there, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be broken. Then, what is the reason that these forces, which do not have confidence in its defense, apply such strong pressures, even to the point of making MC NAMARA yield, for deployment of an ABM system? Of course, it is an undeniable fact that there exists the mutual dependence setup between industries and the military, centering on the missile industry.

However, what I want to point out in parallel with this is that these forces assert, as an axiom, the philosophy of the "absolute superiority of the U. S." which has consistently run through the postwar U. S. world strategy. This is the second reason that I say that deployment of an ABM system is the carrying over of the old problem.

How deep-rooted is this philosophy is clear from the position of MC NAMARA who was opposed to an ABM system. In other words, MC NAMARA was opposed to "wasteful superiority" for the reason that "an ABM system is not necessary, because ICBM's can fully maintain U. S. superiority." He is not different from the ABM promotion faction in that he stands on the premise that U. S. superiority is a matter of course. In this sense, it can be said that he yielded to the ABM faction, not only because pressure was applied, but also because of the inherent weakness in his own thinking.

Here again, deployment of an ABM system means continuation of the old problem and further worsening of the problem. This is true from the following two aspects.

1. There is basic similarity in the view on America between MC NAMARA and the ABM faction, but there is an important difference between them as far as the image of the other nation is concerned. When MC NAMARA asserts that it is possible to deter war with ICBM's alone, he thinks that the other side has ability to exercise self-restraint, rationally anticipating the ravages of a nuclear war; namely, there is an aspect about him to trust the other side's reason. However, the ABM faction supposes that the other nation is so irrationally aggressive as to make an attack, even in defiance of nuclear retaliation by ICBM's, and intends to secure greater superiority. In this

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sense, we should not overlook the fact that deployment of "defensive weapons" called the ABM system functionally expresses deeper distrust in and hostility against the other nation than ever.

2. However, more important than this is the point of how the U. S. has been utilizing its military superiority. DUVERGER of France, who invented the expression "unequal co-existence" at the time of the Middle East war, said: "The Soviet Union, since the Hungarian Revolt, has not used its military strength in its sphere of influence. However, the U. S. has come to depend on its military strength more in its sphere of influence (for example, the Dominican Republic). Except in Cuba, the Soviet Union avoided using its military force outside its sphere of influence, but the U. S. use of military strength is becoming an everyday happening more and more, and is becoming more intense. If the Soviet Union were to help the Arab nations, and were to land its military forces in Egypt and bomb Israel day after day, this would be madness. However, the U. S. has been taking this kind of action in Vietnam for the past several years."

U. S. military superiority which has thus been used will not be strengthened further due to the ABM system. Of course, the Soviet Union's ABM poses a problem. However, under such "unequal co-existence," the U. S. must bear the first political responsibility for the sharp increase in Soviet ICBM's and ABM, especially accompanying the intensification of the Vietnam war. Under this critical political situation, even if ABM's are "defensive weapons" ideologically and abstractly, they cannot but increase international distrust, actually, and intensify the arms race and international tension. The international situation surrounding Japan is also exactly the same. Even if Japan comes under the "thin ABM network" of the U. S., it will only have low defensive ability, after all, and this will reversely lead to an increase in China's armaments, and tension in Asia.

There are still other problems. According to MC NAMARA, the possibility that one million American citizens may die will not be wiped out even if a "thin ABM network" is set up against China. Still further, concerning relations with the Soviet Union, it is calculated that even if a "thick ABM network" is spread around nuclear bases and major cities in the U. S., about 100 million American citizens will die. However, is it normal to consider this ABM system a "defensive weapon?" Also, is it a sane policy to deploy an ABM system around big cities on the premise that it cannot be helped that inhabitants of medium and small cities are killed? This is not limited to ABM's. The same thing can be said about the nuclear deterrent strategy by ICBM's, which MC NAMARA asserted to be more rational. Is it normal to think that it is meaningful for the U. S. to kill 50 million Soviet people with nuclear weapons in retaliation, after 50 million American citizens are killed by a forestallment attack of the Soviet Union, thus, causing a toll of 100 million lives?

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In order to extricate ourselves from the quagmire of such thinking, it is necessary for us to begin first with, thoroughly looking at the meaninglessness of nuclear war and the arms race, and ascertain what is sanity. If we do so it will become instantly clear how sane the view held by the Japanese people toward nuclear war is. Even in the U. S., as early as 1958, the Gallup public opinion poll showed that the average view was that "only three of 10 U. S. citizens can survive a nuclear war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union." We Japanese should have greater confidence in our "nuclear allergy."

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ABM Deployment is Minus to International Situation

KOKUBO
November Issue, 1967

By Junnosuke KISHIDA, member of the Asahi's Editorial Committee

Unavoidable Selection

It was expected that America would decide on the deployment of ABM's sooner or later.

The reason was, first of all, that strong pressure was applied for their deployment by the military, Congress and the industrial world. It is said that in America 15,000 firms, large and small, are related to ABM's. If these firms, though 12,000 of them are minor ones, have spent Defense Department development funds amounting to about four billion dollars, and their technology has reached such a level as to produce ABM's to be used in actual fighting, it is natural that pressure should be applied for the production of some ABM's and their deployment. This, combined with strategists' desire to have an up-to-date weapons system, has probably become pressure on Congress.

Furthermore, in view of next year's Presidential election, it was necessary for President JOHNSON to make a decision on the deployment of ABM's as his Congressional or election policy. The New York Times, referring to the latest decision on the deployment of ABM's, commented that they are deployed neither against the Soviet Union nor China, but against the Republican Party. The comment has some reason.

Secondly, there were several factors which supported the above pressure.

China has reportedly developed ICBM's, which can reach America, at a tempo much quicker than expected. A report released by the U. S. Senate and House Joint Atomic Energy Committee on August 2 estimated that China will have ICBM's as weapons for actual fighting before 1972 or in 1970 at the earliest. U. S. Defense Secretary MC NAMARA, in a report, states that American ABM's will be effective in defending the country against China's ICBM's.

It takes about five years to deploy ABM's. It is therefore, not too early for America to begin deploying ABM's from this year.

It has been confirmed that the Soviet Union has already deployed ABM's around Moscow. There is the intelligence report that an ABM network extends eastward from Talin via Leningrad. America, therefore, proposed to the Soviet Union to start negotiations on freezing ABM's at the end of last year, but almost no progress has been seen in such negotiations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is rapidly increasing its amount of ICBM's. The

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British Strategic Research Institute estimates that the Soviet Union will possess 520 ICBM's at the beginning of 1968. It will be nearly half the number of the U. S. holdings, though last year the Soviet holding was one-third of them. According to the recent judgment of military sources, in 1970 the Soviet Union will surpass America in the total destructive power of such missiles. In other words, the opinion is gaining ground that a megaton gap will appear between the two countries by that time. Strategists have begun to discuss the missile gap between the U. S. and the Soviet Union again.

The U. S. ABM technology has considerably progressed. Sprint missiles to be used for low altitudes can be now employed for actual fighting. MAR's (multi-array radar) for detection, identification and pursuit of ICBM's and MSR's (missile site radar) to guide ABM's have reached the stage of practical use. They are superior in performance to those made by the Soviet Union. Only the Spartan missile for interception in space is now at the blueprint stage. This is the present situation of the development of U. S. ABM's. Naturally, strategists judged that they should be deployed. The year before last the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended their deployment.

Thirdly, apart from such external conditions, there is a reason for America to think it desirable to deploy ABM's.

This is because America, as well as the Soviet Union as a big nuclear power, wants to maintain a gap over other nuclear powers. China and France, as nuclear powers, are developing ICBM's or Polaris-type atomic-powered submarines in accordance with their respective nuclear plans. Such big nuclear powers as the United States and the Soviet Union want to maintain a gap between them and other nuclear powers by developing a new nuclear weapons system more powerful than that of the latter. As technological development is unlimited, unless a drastic disarmament measure is taken, both the U. S. and the Soviet Union have each to deploy a new weapons system in accordance with their technical development in order to establish a peace structure under the command of the two countries.

Furthermore, America has a desire to maintain the military gap now existing between the country and the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union had deployed ABM's, as was confirmed, in November last year, therefore, it was inevitable for America to deploy an ABM network larger than that of the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Balance Between U. S. and USSR Becomes Unstable

It is inevitable, however, that America's deployment of ABM's should make the U. S.-Soviet nuclear balance unstable and their nuclear strategy more complicated.

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Until ABM's appeared, nuclear weapons had been believed to be offensive weapons with no defense. This belief was strengthened when ICBM's to be fired from underground and ballistic missiles to be carried by atomic-powered submarines became capable of being employed. The fact that one could not plan an attack on the other without expecting fatal retaliation gave birth to a kind of military stability between the U. S. and the Soviet Union in the form of a mutual deterrent system.

Therefore, U. S. Defense Secretary MC NAMARA, referring to the ICBM plan and the Polaris missile plan in the so-called Posture Statement in 1965, clarified that the U. S. would not have more than 1,000 Minutemans, 54 Tital 11's, 41 Polaris missile vessels or 656 missiles and 680 B52 strategic bombers as strategic nuclear retaliation power.

The budget for strategic nuclear power showed a continued decline from 1962 until it was reduced to 5,100 million dollars. The budget for 1968, however, has been increased by about one billion dollars. This is to modernize and improve the nuclear offensive power in order to cope with the Soviet Union's ABM deployment. The continuous reduction of the budget for the strategic nuclear offensive power until 1967 was based on the judgment that a mutually deterrent state could be maintained by restricting strategic weapons systems.

ABM's however, become a factor to destroy this mutual deterrent system, because they undermine the foundation of offensive weapons' overwhelming superiority over defensive weapons, which worked as deterrent.

Of course, there is an argument that the combination of ICBM's, offensive weapons, and ABM's, defensive weapons, will give birth to a new, stabilized deterrent system. Such an argument is introduced by Prof. Donald BRENNAN at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the June issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Take, for instance, that a balance of offensive nuclear weapons is maintained between the U. S. and the USSR when the former has 1,000 ICBM's and the latter 500 ICBM's. If the two countries come to have ABM's, which can shoot down 30 per cent of the ICBM's of the other party, it will mean that the two countries are pitted against each other with 70 per cent of the ICBM's actually possessed. This will not disturb the balance of ICBM's between the two countries. Thus says the argument introduced by Prof. BRENNAN.

Once America, in its overall disarmament plan, proposed that both the U. S. and the Soviet Union should reduce their nuclear weapons at the same rate at each stage of disarmament. The U. S. thought that this form of disarmament could maintain the balance of nuclear weapons between the two countries. So, the same idea can be applied to a weapons system with ICBM's and ABM's combined.

If the deployment of ABM's has the same effect as to reduce the number of ICBM's in accordance with the rate of deployed ABM's, there will be a new, stabilized

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deterrent system. The situation will be the same as the step-by-step realization of disarmament. This is what has been introduced.

This theory, however, has a serious defect.

We must note the fact that there is a difference between the U. S. and the Soviet Union in the defense power of ABM's and the power for ICBM's to destroy the defense network, and that this power changes as time passes.

In case a deterrent system consists only of offensive weapons, it is easier to discuss their balance between two countries. In case an ICBM attacks a city or an industrial center, it will make no great difference, even if it misses the target by one to five kilometers.

In the case of ICBM's, therefore, decisive factors are the amount, non-frailty and power of the warheads. If America can learn the Soviet Union's ICBM holdings, it will be comparatively easy for America to decide simply on the number of ICBM's to be possessed by America in order to maintain a balance in the weapons between the two countries.

In the case of ABM's, however, numerical calculations cannot be made so easily, because the performance of Soviet ABM's is not known so correctly.

Even if America tries to establish an ABM network to cope with the performance and amount of Soviet ABM's, America does not necessarily know how the Soviet ABM can approach an ICBM (in this case, if the ABM approaches three kilometers to the warhead of the ICBM and explodes its one-megaton H-bomb warhead, it is considered as somewhat effective). Neither has America any means to investigate the number of Soviet ABM's. Therefore, in spite of the above supposition that ABM's can shoot down 30 per cent of the ICBM's, this rate cannot be confirmed. This is a fundamental difference between ABM's and ICBM's. This poses the problem that a balance cannot be accurately calculated.

America announces the performance of its own ABM's comparatively well. If, therefore, the Soviet Union considers that its ABM's are inferior to those of the U. S. in performance, the country can increase the number of its ABM's to some extent in order to maintain a balance. On the other hand, America will investigate the actual deployment of Soviet ABM's by utilizing, for instance, a reconnaissance satellite. If it is judged that America is inferior in number, pressure is sure to be applied for increasing the number of U. S. ABM's. America will be forced to increase their number. Then, the Soviet Union will take some countermeasure. It is certain to take a countermeasure by increasing the number of missiles, whether they may be ICBM's or ABM's. This will be repeated. It can be said, therefore, that there is a big possibility that the deployment of ABM's will trigger a new armaments race.

Furthermore, in case the deterrent system is composed of two kinds of missiles, offensive and defensive, instead of offensive weapons alone, one party can

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increase ICBM's or ABM's freely in order to cope with the other party's increase in ICBM's. This will make the problem more complicated. Moreover, there is another problem in that it is difficult to estimate what power ICBM's have to break through a defensive network. We cannot but think that the two countries' efforts to maintain a balance are likely to cause an armaments race.

True Mutual Understanding Fundamentally Difficult

The only sure method to prevent such an armaments race is for the United States and the Soviet Union to promote mutual understanding as much as possible so that one may not misunderstand the intentions and contents of deployed missiles of the other. In case the deterrent system of deployed ICBM's alone is stabilized, stability was maintained not only by the number of weapons on each side, but also by mutual understanding between the two parties. In order to secure a mutual deterrent system based on the combination of offensive and defensive weapons (ABM's), therefore, mutual understanding between the two countries must be further promoted.

This promotion of mutual understanding, however, has a limit because it is conceivable that the Soviet Union deployed ABM's primarily aiming at securing some superiority over America, though it may have been partly a countermeasure against China.

The world order of nuclear weapons is maintained by America, ranking first, the Soviet Union second and other nuclear powers third and so forth. This forms an international political order. When there was obvious confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, so far as confrontation was concerned, a balance was maintained between the two countries or the East and West, and even if the Soviet Union was inferior to the United States in the number of nuclear weapons, there was no need to worry about it from an international political standpoint.

If, however, a U. S. Soviet conciliation structure or the two countries' control system is established, America's superiority will become overwhelming. If the Soviet Union is not necessarily contented with its second position in the world, the country will find it advantageous to shake America's superiority by constantly developing and deploying some new weapons system or other. This is another important reason why the Soviet Union has deployed ABM's.

In order to achieve such an objective, the Soviet Union must judge that it will be advantageous not to clarify the performance of its own ABM's. In other words, the Soviet Union judges that if it does not disclose its intentions, it will raise the country's position in international politics. This poses the problem that mutual understanding has necessarily its own limit.

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When U. S. Defense Secretary MC NAMARA announced a decision on America's ABM deployment at a UPI meeting held in San Francisco on September 18, most of his speech seemed to be directed toward the Soviet Union. It seemed that the objective of his speech was to convey America's intentions to the Soviet Union as fully as possible, though he finally added that it would be a thin ABM deployment against China.

In conclusion, U. S. Defense Secretary MC NAMARA stated that the greatest worry now facing America is that it does not know in detail what intentions the Soviet Union has in deploying ABM's.

It seemed that by this statement he wanted to tell the Soviet Union that America was trying to learn the Soviet intentions. It may be difficult, however, to solve the problem that it is advantageous for the Soviet Union that America cannot fully understand the Soviet intentions in its own ABM deployment. As long as it is judged that this state will continue between the two countries to some extent in the future, we should know that the deterrent system based on ICBM-ABM combination will be constantly shaken and destabilized.

Complicated Influence over Allies

The ABM deployment will not only become a destabilizing factor between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it will also affect American allies' sense of reliance on America and may destabilize its relations with its allies.

America's offensive strategic nuclear power protects both America and its allies from the enemy's attack as deterrent power. It does not matter whether these ICBM's may be in the homeland of America or what sea Polaris submarines may be cruising.

If, however, ABM's are to be deployed thinly in the U. S. homeland, Alaska, Hawaii and other U. S. territory, as is reported, they will serve as protecting the Americans alone and not the peoples of the allies. This will certainly make the allies feel that they are discriminated against. America alone will be protected like a fortress by deterrent weapons both offensive and defensive, while the allies will have no new weapon system deployed to protect the lives of their peoples, though they may be protected by offensive deterrent weapons.

It is natural, therefore, that the opinion should be aired by allies, especially NATO members, that the ABM deployment problem should be studied. In order to cope with it, America may study the deployment of an ABM fleet to protect the allies.

According to the latest information, studies have begun on deploying an ABM fleet, for instance, in the East China Sea or the Japan Sea.

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Thus, an attempt is being made to place the allies under an ABM umbrella. The ABM deployment at sea requires the development of a new-type ABM missile remodeled from the Spartan missile in order to be loaded on a vessel. It is also necessary to develop a high-performance radar small enough to be loaded on a ship. In the case of a ship, its form will adversely affect the functions of the radar. Such a new technical problem must be solved in the future.

This ABM fleet plan is, so to speak, a desk plan. It is to be carried out in the future. It is inconceivable that America is so generous that it is ready to cooperate with its allies in deploying ABM's by leaving its own ABM deployment thin. In the recent nuclear non-proliferation negotiations, America's non-nuclear allies keenly felt a conflict of interests between nuclear and non-nuclear nations. Is it not that they will again feel the same discrimination?

An ABM fleet poses another problem for Japan, because, if the above plan is pushed, it will be necessary for Japan to consult with the U. S. on the plan and Japan's share in it. This may invite a situation running counter to Japan's basic policy followed hithertofore in order to stay away from nuclear weapons as far as possible.

Furthermore, as the planned ABM deployment means strengthening nuclear structures to be established reciprocally and directly between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, passing their allies, it may result in reducing America's allies' sense of reliance on the U. S. nuclear power. It will be no wonder that the same feelings as to have driven France to possess nuclear weapons should be intensified through the strengthening of U. S. - Soviet reciprocal nuclear structures.

In discussing the nuclear proliferation problem, such expressions as vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation are often used. Vertical nuclear proliferation means that a nuclear power increases offensive nuclear weapons or has new defensive nuclear equipment such as ABM's. Horizontal nuclear proliferation means the proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear nations. This is the so-called nuclear proliferation. In case vertical nuclear proliferation is left unchecked, a military gap between nuclear and non-nuclear nations will be come widened. As a result, non-nuclear nations will be placed in a ravine among nuclear powers, and they will increasingly lose the sense of security.

The ABM deployment will enlarge the psychological gap between American and its allies, a conflict of interests will increase between nuclear and non-nuclear nations, and a military gap between America and its allies will become larger -- these will reduce the allies' reliance on the U. S. nuclear umbrella.

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Probing the Possibility of Non-Nuclear ABM

KOKUBO

November, 1967 issue

by Makoto ISHII (the Yomiuri's International Situation Survey Association)

In discussions on ABM, the first point to come up in relation to Japan is the fact that "ABM is a nuclear weapon." It is true that both the Spartan and the Sprint, which are the two missiles to be used in the Nike-X system, now being developed by America, and such ABM's as Galosh, which the Soviet Union is now said to be in the process of deploying, are all fitted with nuclear warheads. Especially, it is said that missile-intercepting missiles to be used at ultra-high altitude, use megaton-class hydrogen bomb warheads.

Enemy missiles will come flying in at a speed of 20 mach in the case of ICBM's (20 times the speed of sound; as the speed of ordinary bullets is 3 mach at the most, it is about seven times as fast as ordinary bullets) and even in the case of IRBM's, the speed will be about 12 mach. The flight time needed is about 30 to 40 minutes in the case of ICBM's and a dozen or so minutes in the case of IRBM's [sic]. In order to intercept such enemy missiles, there is no doubt at all that the best way would be to combine a high-speed missile with a nuclear warhead, which has powerful force and a big effective radius.

Then, the next question is whether it will be impossible to intercept missiles unless the intercepting missiles are fitted with nuclear warheads. At the present stage, it is more reliable and also easier to obtain if nuclear warheads are used, and therefore, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union is engaging in full-scale development of ABM's with non-nuclear warheads. However, several plans have been reported.

For example, research on a warhead using chemical materials, which will produce powerful heat and which can take the place of nuclear warheads is now being conducted in America (Newsweek, January 2, 1967). At the present time, American ABM plan is a two-stage plan, using Spartans and Sprints. As the third stage, another missile, named Hybex, is being considered. This missile is for use at the very last stage of interception at an altitude of 60 kilometers. In order to intercept a missile at such a high altitude, it is difficult to use a nuclear warhead. It requires a chemical warhead which has no danger of producing lethal fallout.

From a similar way of thinking, the possibility of flying a balloon, containing explosive gas, and destroying enemy warheads by the explosion of this balloon, has been under study from about three years ago. It is said that this will be effective as an ABM and also in intercepting enemy aircraft. (Technology Week, November 14, 1966) It sounds absurdly relaxed to talk about balloons to counter the most ultra-modern weapon of ICBM, but there were also experiments using guns instead of missiles

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to intercept missiles, about five years ago. This was a joint study made by the United States Army and a Canadian University (Air Force Magazine, November, 1963), but the results since then are not known.

There is also the idea of converting the ball bombs now being used by America in Vietnam into an ABM. A ball bomb is about the size of a baseball ball. The outer skin of the ball is about one centimeter thick, and inside it, several hundred small, steel balls, like the balls for pin-ball machines are packed tightly into it. Explosives are also packed into the ball, and when this is detonated, the steel balls are scattered widely, in an area of several ten meters, and will kill human beings and animals. Now, the size of a nuclear warhead is about 1.8 meters to 4.5 meters in length, and the diameter ranges from a little over two meters, in the case of warheads for large-size ICBM's to 75 centimeters in the case of small ones (about the size of Minuteman missiles of America). It will not be possible to destroy such a warhead with balls like those used for pin-ball machines. However, if they were to hit a warhead in the airless outer space, a warhead flying at a speed of 20 mach, it will be possible to damage the heat-resisting material on the surface. In that case, when the warhead re-enters the atmosphere, there is said to be a possibility of its burning itself up. There are also such ideas as blowing up a large amount of sand, in place of balls, thereby creating a "sand cloud" very high in the skies, and rubbing off the protective outside skin on the surface of the warhead, or scattering chemicals in the high altitude and eroding the outside surface of warheads.

Concerning interception with small steel balls, there is the following calculation: In the case of interception with a nuclear warhead, it is said that the effective radius within the atmosphere is a little over the radius of the fire-ball which is created by nuclear explosion. The radius of the fire-ball in the case of 10 kilo-tons is said to be 140 meters, and in the case of 20 kilo-tons, 180 meters. If steel balls are scattered around in place of this fire-ball, the situation is said to be as follows: According to this calculation, the surface space of a semi-sphere with a radius of 200 meters is 252,000 square meters. If the diameter of the warhead is assumed to be 1.5 meters, the cross-section space would be 1.76 square meters. Consequently, if about 150,000 small steel balls are scattered about at equal intervals, at least one of them should logically hit the warhead. The weight of one steel ball of a 6-millimeter diameter is 0.9 grams. Therefore, 150,000 steel balls will weigh a total of 136 kilograms. If 450,000 balls, which is three times the above-mentioned number, were to be scattered, the weight would still be 405 kilograms. Therefore, even with the additional weight of the outside case and other appendages, the total weight could be kept down to about the same weight as a nuclear warhead, that is, within one ton.

In the Soviet Union, it is said that a method called "artificial lightning" is being studied. Of course, it still seems to be at the stage of ex-

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periment within a laboratory, but the principle seems to be to "electrocute" the enemy warhead by artificially releasing electricity at a high altitude. No date on methods or the amount of electricity needed have been released.

This is still a matter for the future, but what all nations are turning their attention to is the laser ballistic missiles defense. The sun and other light, such as electric light, emit light rays of various wave lengths, in all directions. Laser is a device for making a light source emit light rays concentratedly in one direction, and at a certain fixed light wave length. Today, it is being developed for use in measuring distance, communications and minute processing, but it is well known that it could become a "death ray". The question is the emission power of laser. At present, it is generally about five or six kilowatts. However, ever since the success in laser emission in 1960, it is said that the emission power of laser is being increased by one digit every year. If it were to be developed at such a tempo, the emission capacity of laser may possibly be increased to several ten thousand kilowatts within the next several years. The burning up of enemy warheads in a brief second, using this tremendous emission capacity of laser is naturally quite conceivable.

If the intercepting of missiles were to be impossible unless one used nuclear warheads, non-nuclear nations will lose even the possibility of having a system of defense against missile attacks, once the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is concluded, and this will result in further widening the strategic gap between nuclear and non-nuclear nations. In this respect, the significance of non-nuclear BMD, which, unlike the present ABM, has far less possibility of being converted to attack weapons, should be re-studied.

In the nuclear age, "threat" or "deterrent" when viewed from the reverse side, is made up of "military capacity" multiplied by "state intention." To give one example, China's coming to have ICBM's, that is, military capacity, will become a "threat" even though its "intention" should be very small. Conversely, if its military capacity were zero, then, no one would feel it a threat, no matter how big its "intentions."

The "military capacity" mentioned here does not merely mean a completed weapons system, but also includes quite frequently technical levels and industrial facilities which are capable of producing such a system. Nuclear development is not being considered in Japan today, at least under the present situation. However, foreign countries list Japan at the top of potential nuclear nations. That is because the atomic reactor No. 1 at Tokai Village, the Atomic Fuel Corporation's plutonium processing plant, the re-processing plant slated to be completed soon, and Japan's nuclear technology are capable of producing atomic bombs within several years, once such an "intention is decided."

In this sense, Japan's engaging in more research on non-nuclear BMD and its raising its technical level in this field can possibly provide a deterrent, and it is a matter which should be studied more fully.